"Ist der Patient ein Mensch?" is a collection of articles. Its central topic is the question if the object of modern medicine is still the human being or if just organs and tissues are treated by medical doctors? The drawing on the book cover shows a lung instead of a human patient lying in a hospital bed. The approaches to this topic are diverse and surprising. E.g. the surgeon Ankersmit argues that it is impossible for him to see the human (...) being in the body lying on the operation table because then he would be unable to perform his work professionally. Other texts stretch the topic of the book to the questions whether medical doctors are human beings or if the human being of today is a "patient" in the sense of a current crisis of anthropology. Also questions like patient autonomy and communication with patients are tackled. The book is edited by Helmut Hofbauer, Lukas Kaelin, Hendrik Jan Ankersmit & Walter Feigl. Authors are: Lukas Kaelin, Gabriele Baumann, Hendrik Jan Ankersmit, Renate Heinz, Claus G. Krenn, Alexander Lapin, Sigrid Pilz, Margot Ham-Rubisch, Petra Herzeg, Klaus Spiess, Lucie Strecker, Paul Ferstl, Helmut Hofbauer & Peter Kampits. (shrink)

Politische Theologie erlebt derzeit ein Revival: Nachdem es eine längere Zeit lang still um die Politische Theologie geworden war, erfreut sie sich - nicht zuletzt angesichts multipler Krisenerscheinungen - aktuell wieder eines wachsenden Interesses. Aber was ist,,Politische Theologie" eigentlich? Die Einführung bietet eine begriffsgeschichtliche Orientierung und systematische Einordnung dieses schillernden Begriffs, eine vertiefende Auseinandersetzung mit den Politischen Theologien des Staatsrechtlers Carl Schmitt und des katholischen Theologen Johann Baptist Metz sowie eine Reflexion ausgewählter gegenwärtiger Diskussionsbeiträge in der deutschsprachigen katholischen Theologie. Das (...) Buch verdeutlicht die ungebrochene Aktualität und Relevanz fundierter wissenschaftlicher und öffentlicher Auseinandersetzungen mit der Politischen Theologie. Der Inhalt Politische Theologie - Begriff und Geschichte Politische Politische Theologie (Carl Schmitt) Theologische Politische Theologie (Johann B. Metz) Gegenwart theologischer Politischer Theologie Die Zielgruppen Studierende und Dozierende der Theologie, Philosophie, Sozial- und Politikwissenschaften Interessiertes Fachpublikum Die Autoren Jan Niklas Collet ist Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Institut für Katholische Theologie der TU Dortmund (Systematische Theologie). Dr. Jan-Hendrik Herbst ist Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Institut für Katholische Theologie der TU Dortmund (Religionspädagogik). (shrink)

Kaum ein anderer Denker hat die jüdische Moderne in einem so hohen Maße beeinflusst wie der Philosoph Baruch Spinoza. Als eine intellektuelle Grenzfigur, die nach ihrer Verbannung aus der jüdischen Gemeinde Amsterdams im Jahre 1656 in die christlich-abendländische Geisteswelt eintrat, inspirierte er jene Aufklärer der Haskala, die ein gutes Jahrhundert später nach einem eigenen jüdischen Weg in die europäische Moderne suchten. Diese Denker trafen dabei auf eine nichtjüdische Gelehrtenwelt, in der sich mit dem Namen des niederländischen Philosophen ebenso idealisierende Erwartungen (...) wie irrationale Ängste gegenüber dem in Spinoza identifizierten intellektuellen Idealtypus des Jüdischen verbanden. Somit ist die Geschichte der jüdischen Rezeption Spinozas seit dem Zeitalter der europäischen Aufklärung stets ein Indikator dafür, welchen Stand das wechselhafte Verhältnis zwischen jüdischer und nichtjüdischer Welt gerade erreicht hatte. Im Nachvollzug der Verlaufsformen der jüdischen Spinoza-Rezeption vom 17. bis ins 20. Jahrhundert zeigt die vorliegende Studie, wie sich jüdisches Selbstbild und Fremdzuschreibung immer wieder wechselseitig bedingt haben. (shrink)

Diese Studie widmet sich der Grundfrage der Politischen Philosophie nach der richtigen Beschaffenheit der grundlegenden gesellschaftlichen und politischen Institutionen, ihre methodische Problemstellung besteht in der Verbindung von philosophischen und ökonomischen Theorieperspektiven. Das Buch vollzieht eine kritische Analyse der wichtigsten klassischen und modernen Ansätze dazu und überführt diese Kritik in einen konstruktiven Entwurf, der wesentlich auf die Theorie der Grundbefähigungen zurückgreift. Dieses auf Amartya Sen und Martha Nussbaum zurückgehende Konzept knüpft die Legitimation eines Staatswesens an die Bedingung, dass es jedem seiner (...) Bürger ein bestimmtes Minimum an realen Lebensmöglichkeiten garantiert oder zumindest um dessen Garantierung bemüht ist. Die Hauptthese des Buches lässt sich so zusammenfassen, dass die Frage »Equality of what?« für den modernen Sozialstaat weder mit dem Konzept eines für alle garantierten Nutzenminimums noch mit dem Konzept eines für alle garantierten Mindesteinkommens beantwortet werden kann, sondern mit dem Konzept eines garantierten Minimums an Grundbefähigungen, d. h. an realen Lebensoptionen, über die ein Individuum verfügen kann. (shrink)

Although dominated by consequentialist and deontological thinking, the debate about human enhancement has been enriched by several arguments from virtue theory and from virtue ethics. This article provides an overview of the virtue ethical arguments in the debate and identifies several topics in the ethics of human enhancement where the argumentative resources of virtue ethics have not yet been sufficiently considered.

Abstract When new methods of generating information about individuals leave the confined space of research application the possibility of morally dubious application arises. The current propagation of neuroscientific diagnostics leads to new possibilities of misuse and accordingly new needs for the protection of individual privacy emerge. While most current privacy discussion focuses on sensationalist applications which aim/claim to gather information about psychological traits or even the content of thoughts, the more sober but much more realistic endeavour to gather health data (...) from research or medical imaging studies is widely neglected. I will try to answer the question if and in how far data from neuroscientific imaging technologies require special protection. Two developments form the background of the ethical discussion: the increased diagnostic power of neuroimaging techniques and the wider distribution of this technology beyond specialized medical offices and clinics. The first development is likely to broaden the scope of data, which are considered relevant for health care and related decisions. The latter is likely to widen the scope of persons who might have access to diagnostic results without at the time taking the role of a doctor towards the person diagnosed. I will argue that neuroimaging data are currently primarily medical data and that the associated standards of consent and confidentiality are worth protecting. Even nonmedical applications of neuroimaging technology inherit too much of the diagnostic power for which they were originally invented, for it to be advisable to drop the accompanying consent and confidentiality requirements. (shrink)

Das Buch bietet eine Gesamtdarstellung der noch relativ jungen Disziplin der Neuroethik. Es führt die derzeit separat geführten Diskussionen der forschungs- und medizinethisch ausgerichteten Ethik in den Neurowissenschaften mit der in professionellen und öffentlichen Diskussionen vernachlässigten alltäglichen Ethik des Umgangs mit Manipulationen des menschlichen Geistes jenseits von medizinischen und Forschungskontexten zusammen. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf den moralischen Implikationen der mechanischen Veränderung des menschlichen Geistes.

Non-invasive brain stimulation promises innovative experimental possibilities for psychology and neurosci- ence as well as new therapeutic and palliative measures in medicine. Because of its good risk–benefit ratio, non-invasiveness and reversibility as well as its low effort and cost it has good chances of becoming a wide- spread tool in science, medicine and even in lay use. While most issues in medical and research ethics such as informed consent, safety, and potential for misuse can be handled with manageable effort, the (...) real promise of brain stimulation does raise one prominent moral worry: it may lay the foundation of reliable, precise and stable manipulations of the mind. This article addresses this worry and concludes that it is not the possibility of manipulation, but the shift in our understanding of our mind which stands in need of careful consideration. (shrink)

This paper explores the role and resolution of disagreements between physicians and their diagnostic AI-based decision support systems. With an ever-growing number of applications for these independently operating diagnostic tools, it becomes less and less clear what a physician ought to do in case their diagnosis is in faultless conflict with the results of the DSS. The consequences of such uncertainty can ultimately lead to effects detrimental to the intended purpose of such machines, e.g. by shifting the burden of proof (...) towards a physician. Thus, we require normative clarity for integrating these machines without affecting established, trusted, and relied upon workflows. In reconstructing different causes of conflicts between physicians and their AI-based tools—inspired by the approach of “meaningful human control” over autonomous systems and the challenges to resolve them—we will delineate normative conditions for “meaningful disagreements”. These incorporate the potential of DSS to take on more tasks and outline how the moral responsibility of a physician can be preserved in an increasingly automated clinical work environment. (shrink)

Agency without Actors? New Approaches to collective Action is rethinking a key issue in social theory and research: the question of agency. The history of sociological thought is deeply intertwined with the discourse of human agency as an effect of social relations. In most recent discussions the role of non-humans gains a substantial impact. Consequently the book asks: Are nonhumans active, do they have agency? And if so: how and in what different ways? The volume offers a critical state-of-the-art debate (...) of internationally and nationally leading scholars within Sociology, Social Anthropology and STS on agency (Latour, Law, Michael, Rammert etc.). It fosters the productive exchange of empirical settings and theoretical views by outlining a wide range of novel accounts that link human and non-human agency. It tries to understand social-technical, political and environmental networks as different forms of agency that produce discrete and identifiable entities like humans, animals, technical artifacts. It also asks how different types of (often conflicting) agency and agents actors are distinguished in practice, how they are maintained and how they interfere with each other. (shrink)

In order to refute the widely held belief that the game known as ‘Newcomb's paradox’ is physically nonsensical and impossible to imagine (e.g. because it involves backward causation), I tell a story in which the game is realized in a classical, deterministic universe in a physically plausible way. The predictor is a collection of beings which are by many orders of magnitude smaller than the player and which can, with their exquisite measurement techniques, observe the particles in the player's body (...) so accurately that they can predict his choice (in much the same way as we can predict the motion of celestial bodies). I argue that the player, by choosing whether to take only one box or both boxes, influences whether or not, in the past, the predictor put a million pounds into the second box. Yet, I establish that no causal paradox can arise in this set-up. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Dual Use bezeichnet zunächst die Verwendbarkeit eines eigentlich für andere Zwecke intendierten Forschungsergebnisses oder -verfahrens für Zwecke, die die innere oder äußere Sicherheit einer Gesellschaft betreffen. Darunter fällt Forschung, die für militärische, geheimdienstliche, terroristische oder kriminelle Zwecke verwendet werden kann. _Dual Use_ stellt seit über einem Jahrzehnt ein sich beständig verschärfendes Problem für viele Bereiche der Lebenswissenschaften und der Medizin dar, weil viele von deren Ergebnissen geeignet sind aufzuzeigen, wie Menschen, aber auch (Nutz‑)Tiere und Pflanzen manipuliert und attackiert werden (...) können und welche Werkzeuge dafür besonders geeignet sind. Die Digitalisierung in den Lebenswissenschaften hat im Hinblick auf das _Dual-Use-_Problem zwei voneinander unterscheidbare Einflüsse, nämlich einen verschärfenden und einen erweiternden. Dadurch, dass die Digitalisierung schnellere und umfangreichere Forschungs- und Entwicklungsprozesse ermöglicht, verschärft sie das bestehende _Dual-Use_-Problem, weil zugleich das Tempo steigt, in dem die Ergebnisse dieser Forschung für sicherheitsrelevante Zwecke nutzbar gemacht werden können. Zudem erweitert die Digitalisierung der Lebenswissenschaften das _Dual-Use-_Problem, denn einige der digitalen Werkzeuge, die in den Lebenswissenschaften entwickelt und gebraucht werden, können selbst militärische oder sicherheitsrelevante Verwendung finden. Deshalb bedarf es einer breit angelegten Governance inklusive einer breiten Beteiligung der Stakeholder im Forschungsprozess und eines Informationsangebots zu _Dual Use_ in der Ausbildung in guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis über Institutionen, Karrierestufen und Disziplinen hinweg. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 21 Heft: 1 Seiten: 69-98.

"""This book neither wants to make an accusation, nor impose things that are impossible to carry out. It merely wants to make the Balinese and tourists aware of what is happening in this paradise on earth and about the positive infl uence they can have in preserving the culture of the beautiful island of Bali. Tri Hita Karana, the spirit of Bali originated from the rich Balinese-Hindu philosophy. Tri Hita Karana means three causes of happiness: balanced and harmonious relationships of (...) humans with God; of humans with fellow human beings; and of humans with the surrounding nature. Respect and togetherness are essential values in this philosophy. The Hindu doctrine of tat tvam asi, “I am you and you are me”, teaches us that all things are connected. Humans who do not respect God, fellow humans and nature are not respecting themselves, and this will eventually lead to self-destruction. Respect and togetherness will lead to harmony and happiness. Since the Balinese are already living according to the age-old philosophy of Tri Hita Karana, they can contribute to a sustainable environment for their children. The past and the present cannot be separated from each other; the present is born out of the past. Our actions to create a sustainable environment today matter, or in Gandhi’s words: the future depends on what we do today. The authors, Jan Hendrik Peters, a former professor of service studies and Wisnu Wardana, chief-editor of Bali Travel Newspaper, are deeply concerned about the negative infl uences of mass tourism and want to plead for a sustainable future for Bali, by writing this book. “We really do need this book on Bali to make the Balinese people and the international tourists familiar with the essence of Hinduism. If the Balinese follow the philosophy of Tri Hita Karana as a guide in their personal life and business, it means that Bali will be the Island of the Gods forever.” - Ida Pedanda Subali Tianyar, Hindu high priest, Chairman of the Council of Hindu Priests in Indonesia.""". (shrink)

Im Beitrag wird Johannes Drerups pädagogischer Ansatz zum Umgang mit kontroversen Themen im schulischen Unterricht kritisch diskutiert. Aus einer religionspädagogischen Perspektive werden dabei vor allem Leerstellen problematisiert und nicht die Stärken von Drerups Konzeption fokussiert. Moniert werden vor diesem Hintergrund vorwiegend zwei Punkte: Drerups theoretischem Zugriff fehlt ein systematischer Ort für eine gesellschaftliche Kontextanalyse, da er eine gesellschaftstheoretische Modellierung und empirische Spezifizierung der sozialen Verhältnisse im Vagen belässt (1). Dies führt auch dazu, dass die Eigenlogik des Phänomens Religion nicht adäquat (...) berücksichtigt wird. Vielmehr scheint Religion allein in der Perspektive der Extremismusprävention sichtbar zu werden. Darüber hinaus tendiert Drerups Ansatz dazu, den diskursiven Status quo zu verdoppeln und grundlegende Veränderungsperspektiven auszuschließen (2). Dies zeigt sich besonders an Drerups Kriterienkatalog für kontroverse Themen, etwa an der fehlenden Spezifität des politischen Kriteriums. Auch unterrichtspraktische Herausforderungen wie die Frage nach der Möglichkeit von politischen Aktionen werden ausgeklammert, obwohl sie im Zusammenhang mit dem Beutelsbacher Konsens selbst kontrovers in der Politikdidaktik und anderen Fachdidaktiken diskutiert werden. (shrink)

Reliabilism suffers from a problem with long sequences of justifications. The theory of justification provided in process reliabilism allows for an implausibly large extension of ‘justified belief’. According to process reliabilist theory, it is possible that a justifying cognitive process has an arbitrarily low probability of being successful and a justified belief an arbitrarily low probability of being true. This result violates reliabilism’s aims as well as our ordinary standards of justification.

The paper offers a normative analysis of the new Loss & Damage Fund supporting vulnerable countries grappling with climate change-related harms. This fund is primarily financed by affluent nations, often identified as historical polluters. However, the perspective of relational egalitarianism highlights persistent structural injustices in the background of the fund. Addressing them necessitates conceptualizing the fund not merely as an act of cooperative solidarity but as compensation for the consequences of historical and ongoing structural injustices. Properly conceived, the fund manages (...) adverse climate effects and simultaneously tackles their underlying root causes, including the unjust distribution of advantages and power. (shrink)

1. Die erste Hälfte des Kommentars, mit Ausnahme der Kapitel über die Weltseele.

In the debate about actions in virtual environments two interdependent types of question have been pondered: What is a person doing who acts in a virtual environment? Second, can virtual actions be evaluated morally? These questions have been discussed using examples from morally dubious computer games, which seem to revel in atrocities. The examples were introduced using the terminology of “virtual murder” “virtual rape” and “virtual pedophilia”. The terminological choice had a lasting impact on the debate, on the way action (...) types are assigned and on how moral evaluation is supposed to be conducted. However, this terminology and its theoretical consequences, while sometimes resulting in correct results, lead to absurd results when applied across the board. It will be suggested that these absurd consequences can be avoided by a different answer to the question what people in virtual worlds are doing. Alleged virtual actions are first and foremost the creation and modification of data-structures and the resulting output in computer hardware. Such modifications of data structure and imagery can be performed with different intentions, purposes and styles, which will influence the type and moral evaluation of a user’s actions. This reinterpretation allows for a more complex analysis of the moral reasons for praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of actions in virtual environments. This analysis takes not just harm and effects on character into account but the peculiar ways in which speech acts can be morally wrong: e.g. agitatory, deceptive, bullshitting. (shrink)

Current debates in neuroethics engage with extremely diverse technologies, for some of which it is a point of contention whether they should be a topic for neuroethics at all. In this article, I will evaluate extended mind theory’s claim of being able to define the scope of neuroethics’ domain as well as determining the extension of an individual’s mind via its so-called trust and glue criteria. I argue that a) extending the domain of neuroethics by this manoeuvre endangers the theoretical (...) consistency of neuroethics and b) the current state of the trust and glue criteria can introduce a bias towards overstating the relevance which representational devices have in characterising the field of neuroethics as compared to other technologies which are clearly of neuroethical relevance. As a remedy, I suggest a modification of the trust and glue criteria and a broader conception of cognition. (shrink)

Research with psychiatric patients raises frequently discussed, ethical questions, one of which is: Can psychiatric patients give consent to participation in research at all? To answer this and similar questions adequately, it is - according to our thesis - necessary to analyze first, which theoretical assumptions are made in established practice. -/- To solve the question after the possibility of consent, compatible understandings of ‘disease’, ‘illness’ and ‘autonomy’ are crucial, but there is no consensual use of these terms in philosophy. (...) Therefore we first are going to explain different concepts of ‘autonomy’ and ‘disease’. Subsequent to this we will test how the different conceptualizations of ‘autonomy’ and ‘disease’ can be related to each other and how the reasonable combinations shape possible answers to the opening question. It will become apparent that an adequate analysis of ‘autonomy’ and ‘disease’ raises ethical dilemma in psychiatry, for which we shall suggest possible solutions. (shrink)

Enhancement, the improvement of mental capacities with psychoactive substances and technologies has stimulated one of the largest debates in contemporary bioethics. Surprisingly few participants in this debate take note of the tendentious legal status of psychoactive pharmaceuticals as the primary means of enhancement. -/- Enhancement technologies and substances have measurable effects on specific measurable cognitive functions. A major issue of contention in the debate is how to evaluate these effects, i. e. which theory of value to use. It is contested (...) whether the pleasures and achievements resulting from the use of enhancement can be counted as such or can be ignored or devaluate by calling them fraudulent or inauthentic. -/- The alleged and real benefits of enhancement are not expected to be evenly distributed, nor is it always clear whether enhancement is a zero-sum game or has benefits even for the non-users. This results in a complex structure of risks and benefits for individuals and groups, which needs to be broken down in detail. (shrink)

The increased presence of medical AI in clinical use raises the ethical question which standard of explainability is required for an acceptable and responsible implementation of AI-based applications in medical contexts. In this paper, we elaborate on the emerging debate surrounding the standards of explainability for medical AI. For this, we first distinguish several goods explainability is usually considered to contribute to the use of AI in general, and medical AI in specific. Second, we propose to understand the value of (...) explainability relative to other available norms of explainable decision-making. Third, in pointing out that we usually accept heuristics and uses of bounded rationality for medical decision-making by physicians, we argue that the explainability of medical decisions should not be measured against an idealized diagnostic process, but according to practical considerations. We conclude, fourth, to resolve the issue of explainability-standards by relocating the issue to the AI’s certifiability and interpretability. (shrink)

Who is responsible for the events and consequences caused by using artificially intelligent tools, and is there a gap between what human agents can be responsible for and what is being done using artificial intelligence? Both questions presuppose that the term ‘responsibility’ is a good tool for analysing the moral issues surrounding artificial intelligence. This article will draw this presupposition into doubt and show how reference to responsibility obscures the complexity of moral situations and moral agency, which can be analysed (...) with a more differentiated toolset of moral terminology. It suggests that the impression of responsibility gaps only occurs if we gloss over the complexity of the moral situation in which artificial intelligent tools are employed and if—counterfactually—we ascribe them some kind of pseudo-agential status. (shrink)

According to a prominent suggestion in the ethics of transcranial neurostimulation the effects of such devices can be treated as ethically on par with established, pre-neurotechnological alterations of the mind. This parity allegedly is supported by situated cognition theories showing how external devices can be part of a cognitive system. This article will evaluate this suggestion. It will reject the claim, that situated cognition theories support ethical parity. It will however point out another reason, why external carriers or modifications of (...) the mental might come to be considered ethically on par with internal carriers. Section “Why Could There Be Ethical Parity between Neural Tissue and External Tools?” presents the ethical parity theses between external and internal carriers of the mind as well as neurotechnological alterations and established alterations. Section “Extended, Embodied, Embedded: Situated Cognition as a Relational Thesis” will elaborate the different situated cognition approaches and their relevance for ethics. It will evaluate, whether transcranial stimulation technologies are plausible candidates for situated cognition theses. Section “On the Ethical Relevance of Situated Cognition Theses” will discuss criteria for evaluating whether a cognitive tool is deeply embedded with a cognitive system and apply these criteria to transcranial brain stimulation technologies. Finally it will discuss the role diverse versions of situated cognition theory can play in the ethics of altering mental states, especially the ethics of transcranial brain stimulation technologies. (shrink)

An increasing number of research fields must expect that their projects will be classified as susceptible to misuse or otherwise security relevant, even if the reasons or criteria for this classification have not yet been uniformly developed. Research institutions will commonly distribute the obligation to predict and prevent misuse across multiple members and structures including ethics committees. However, cases of misuse occur even in spite of these precautions, raising the question of the type and distribution of responsibility for the resulting (...) harm. This question becomes even more pressing if research ethics committees in their decisions ask researchers to provide a misuse- specific risk assessment or risk mitigation plan and thereby shift back a part of their responsibility on the researchers. While this kind of requirement may be considered as unsatisfactory by researchers, members of research ethics committees or boards and third-party funders, will argue that it fulfils two important functions. On the one hand, it makes use of the best available source for misuse risk-assessment available to most committees; on the other hand, it guarantees that the researchers at least try to take responsibility. If researchers, committee members and others involved discharge their obligation to predict and mitigate misuse risks with due diligence, any backward-looking responsibility they retain is to show agent regret for the results of their work having been misused. (shrink)